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ABSTRACT 
A firm’s expectation about the future business cycle is an important determinant of the decision to train 
apprentices. As German firms typically train apprentices to either fill future skilled worker positions, or as a 
substitute for other types of labor, the current coronavirus crisis will have a strong and negative impact on 
the German economy according to the current business cycle expectations of German firms. To the extent 
that the training decision of a firm depends on its perception of the business cycle, we expect a downward 
shift in the firm’s demand for apprentices and consequently also a decrease in the equilibrium number of 
apprenticeship contracts. We analyze German data on the apprenticeship from 2007 to 2019 and apply first-
differences regressions to account for unobserved heterogeneity across states and occupations, allowing us 
to identify the association between changes in two popular measures of business cycle expectations (the ifo 
Business Climate Index and the ifo Employment Barometer) and subsequent changes in the demand for 
apprentices, the number of new apprenticeship contracts, unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful applicants. 
Taking into account the most recent data on business cycle expectations up to May 2020, we estimate that 
the coronavirus-related decrease in firms’ expectations about the business cycle can be associated with a 
predicted 9% decrease in firm demand for apprentices and an almost 7% decrease in the number of new 
apprenticeship positions in Germany in 2020 (-34,700 apprenticeship contracts; 95% confidence interval: +/- 
8,800). 
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1. Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic is fundamentally altering outlooks in many parts of society. With the 
immediate health implications playing out across the globe, the economic impact is starting to 
show in labor markets as well. The United States has seen an unprecedented jump in 
unemployment figures to 21.0 million in May 2020, up from 7.1 million two months before 
(USBLS, 2020b)1. While Germany has not experienced comparably drastic developments so 
far, unemployment numbers rose from 2.3 million in March to 2.8 million in May (Federal 
Employment Agency, 2020a), economic expectations about the near future, here too, have 
turned decisively pessimistic. The effects of the expected downturn are likely to be felt 
differently across industries and segments of the population. In past crises, especially the young 
have suffered (see, e.g., Bell & Blanchflower, 2011), albeit with marked differences between 
countries. In 2010, as much of the world was dealing with what has been termed the Great 
Recession, the unemployment rate for the youngest labor market cohort (15-24 year-olds) 
mounted to 41.6% in Spain, but was only at 9.9% in Germany (European Commission, 2012). 
As researchers and policy makers seek explanations for such stark disparities, the use of 
apprenticeship systems, with a significant amount of on-the-job training, has frequently moved 
to the front. To what extent are such programs subject to the ups and downs of the economy 
and can they add to the resilience of a labor market during crises, for example, by facilitating 
the transition from school to full-time employment? To answer such questions, we direct our 
attention towards the impact of business cycle developments on the demand for apprentices. If 
such vocational education and training (VET) programs appear more robust to economic 
downturns, they may plausibly play a larger role in supporting the labor market as a whole. 
Thus far, research has outlined theoretical possibilities for both pro-cyclical effects, largely 
                                                 
1 US unemployment numbers include a misclassification error reported by USBLS (2020a). This impacts data 
for March, April, and May. Corrected, likely increased, numbers were not yet available at the time of this 
writing. 
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driven by reduced staffing needs during an economic downturn, as well as counter-cyclical 
outcomes, caused, for example, by lowered opportunity costs of training during less productive 
periods. Most empirical studies so far suggest a pro-cyclical, but small to moderate effect (see, 
e.g., Mühlemann, Wolter, & Wüest, 2009). Furthermore, what matters in this regard, especially 
during more pronounced economic crises, seems to be more the longer term outlook, not the 
specific effect a downturn has on an individual company (Bellmann, Gerner, & Leber, 2014). 
We seek to build on these prior findings and investigate how company expectations about 
business cycle developments influence apprenticeship provision. Subsequently, we attempt to 
project the likely short-term impact of Covid-19 on the German apprenticeship system, based 
on currently available information. We employ annual data on the number of firm-sponsored 
apprenticeship contracts between 2007 and 2018, processed by the Federal Statistical Office 
(DESTATIS) and provided by the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training 
(BIBB). To further differentiate the mechanisms of the expected labor market effect, we utilize 
additional data on the demand for apprentices (i.e., the sum of posted apprenticeship vacancies 
and unfilled positions) as well as the number of both successful and unsuccessful applicants for 
apprenticeship positions from the Federal Employment Agency (2007-2019). Expectations 
about business cycle developments are measured through the ifo Business Climate Index (BCI) 
and the ifo Employment Barometer (EB), two publicly available, monthly surveys among 
German firms, that provide particularly current and useful insights into company expectations 
about the business cycle (Sauer & Wohlrabe, 2020; Wohlrabe, 2018). In investigating business 
cycle effects on this particularly relevant portion of the labor market and deriving a first 
estimate of the exceptional impact of the current Covid-19-linked downturn, we join a highly 
timely debate (see Lüthi & Wolter, 2020b; Maier, 2020 for initial contributions), while there 
are still possibilities for policy makers and organizational stakeholders to react to what is 
unfolding. 
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The following sections are organized as follows. We first provide a brief overview of the 
relevant attributes of the German apprenticeship system and the decisive role firms play therein. 
Subsequently, we offer a summary of the literature on business cycle effects on training 
provision. Chapters 4 and 5 follow with descriptive statistics and further details on our main 
variables, as well as the identification strategy used in our analysis. We then present our results 
and conclude with an outlook on the impact of current economic expectations on apprenticeship 
contracts this fall. 
 
2. The German apprenticeship system and its reliance on firms to offer training positions 
VET in Germany is offered through a publicly regulated “dual” system. It is referred to as 
“dual”, as knowledge and skill acquisition does not only take place in vocational schools, but 
predominantly through practically oriented training and on-the-job learning at companies. 
Programs typically kick off in August or September each year and take students through two to 
three-and-a-half year apprenticeships, which result in qualifications for nationally recognized 
occupations. The specifics are heavily shaped by government regulations as well as negotiations 
between trade unions and employer associations2. Entry to this system is administered mainly 
through private contracts between apprentices and training firms. It is this decision of the firm 
to invest in training apprentices that is paramount for the aggregated amount of training 
provided in the economy as a whole, especially as young school graduates depend on further 
qualification to attain labor market access. We will discuss theoretical motivations for firms to 
offer training positions in greater detail below, but such motivations may be heavily affected 
by firms’ expectations about the future business cycle. Once apprenticeships have begun, 
contractual training agreements can in effect not be terminated prematurely, unless for 
extraordinary circumstances. Dismissal is significantly easier during the first one to four months 
                                                 
2 Hippach-Schneider and Huismann (2016) provide a useful and more comprehensive overview. 
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of the apprenticeship, a period referred to as “probation”. Legal precedent has also long upheld 
that contracts can generally be cancelled without notice or justification prior to the 
commencement of the apprenticeship (Federal Labour Court, 1987). Once the apprenticeship 
has progressed beyond these initial stages, however, the legal and institutional commitment of 
the firm to complete the full, multi-year training period is strong (Dustmann & Schönberg, 
2012). Apart from organizational details, the training contract also includes the wages paid 
throughout the training period. While apprenticeship wages are in principle bound to collective 
agreements, the German apprenticeship market has seen the introduction of a regulatory 
minimum wage at the beginning of 2020. The wage floor was initially set at EUR 515 per month 
and designed to subsequently rise gradually to EUR 620 in 2023 (monthly wage in the first year 
of the apprenticeship program; BMBF, 2019).3 While contracts typically also contain an option 
to transition into regular employment, they formally end upon completion of the apprenticeship 
and publication of final examination results (BMBF, 2018). Hiring decisions of private 
companies are thus essential when it comes to how much training is actually provided to each 
cohort. We do not know when exactly those decisions are made, but, depending on the 
individual industry, recruitment cycles start as early as one year prior to the commencement of 
the apprenticeship program and go all the way through August or September (see, e.g., Azubiyo 
GmbH, 2020)4. Therefore, current, shorter-term expectations about economic prospects can be 
assumed to still factor heavily into this year’s capacity considerations. This has principally been 
confirmed in previous empirical analysis as well (Dietrich & Gerner, 2007).  
 
                                                 
3 Research has described the minimum wage as an “obvious barrier to job training” (Leighton & Mincer, 1981, 
p. 158) early on and argued that employers may, as a result, seek to increase employees’ time allocated to 
productive activities (Hashimoto, 1982), which can be problematic during a recession. While this development is 
not the focus of our undertaking, the cost increases it may potentially represent, could conceivably add to the 
current dynamic in some cases. 
4 Moreover, the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) publishes monthly statistics on the 
number of advertised vacancies, registered applicants, and successfully signed contracts in the German 
apprenticeship market (https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Statistik-nach-
Themen/Ausbildungsstellenmarkt/Ausbildungsstellenmarkt-Nav.html) for the months of January to September. 
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3. Relevant literature 
Research has identified two relevant underlying motivations for companies to hire apprentices: 
productivity, i.e. reasons driven by today’s production requirements, or investment, i.e. reasons 
driven by tomorrow’s production requirements (Lüthi & Wolter, 2020a; Merrilees, 1983; 
Wolter & Ryan, 2011). The production motive (Lindley, 1975) looks at apprentices essentially 
as just another input factor in the production process, a substitute for other labor, albeit often a 
less effective one. There may still be some investment period necessary at the beginning of 
training, but firms hire apprentices predominantly because of the net benefit they incur through 
the productive contributions of apprentices relative to their wages. The more forward-looking 
investment variant (Stevens, 1994) has its roots in Becker’s (1964) human capital theory and 
looks at apprentices mainly as future skilled workers. In this regard, firms are willing to incur 
net costs during the initial training phase, in order to benefit in the future, for example, from 
secured or cheaper access to skilled labor. Prior research contributions have established certain 
characteristics of the labor market, such as information asymmetries (Acemoglu & Pischke, 
1999), mobility costs and a resulting reluctance to relocate (Beckmann, 2002; Harhoff & Kane, 
1997), or rigidities associated with trade unions and works councils (Dustmann & Schönberg, 
2009; Kriechel, Mühlemann, Pfeifer, & Schütte, 2014), which may allow companies to suppress 
wage levels around the provision of training and recover their investment. Cost-benefit analyses 
suggest that investment motives play a decisive role for German firms in their considerations 
around the provisions of apprenticeships, driven significantly by labor market regulations 
(Mühlemann, Pfeifer, Walden, Wenzelmann, & Wolter, 2010). The investment motive, thus, 
helps to explain findings in empirical studies that have demonstrated a willingness by German 
firms to incur substantial net costs during vocational training programs (Dionisius et al., 2009). 
Based on these motivations, the effect of business cycle developments on training provision 
remains ambiguous ex-ante. Naturally, an economic downturn may lead to fewer transactions, 
lowered productivity and, therefore, a decrease in demand for labor, including apprentices. 
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Furthermore, as unemployment increases, so does the availability of skilled labor in the labor 
market, which may alter investment considerations and cause a pro-cyclical response of 
apprenticeships to business cycles. If, on the other hand, skilled workers can be replaced by 
apprentices as a means to lower costs, a counter-cyclical movement could also seem plausible. 
Moreover, increasing training efforts during an economic slump can represent a prudent 
strategy from an investment perspective, if opportunity costs for training tasks of skilled 
employees are lowered and potential rewards for increased productivity are high, once the 
economy picks up again (Brunello, 2009). Additionally, exit options may be relatively poor for 
apprentices during a recession, which may lower the perceived risks around a firm’s training 
investments (Bellmann et al., 2014). Likely, the temporal dimension of the expected downturn 
plays a significant role. In most cases, training involves an up-front investment, especially 
during the early phases of apprenticeships, which may later be recovered by firms (Wolter & 
Ryan, 2011). If uncertainty about the immediate future is sufficiently high, firms may be more 
hesitant to incur such investment costs, even if productivity benefits from training exceed initial 
expenses over the course of the full contract duration. Additionally, in Germany, an estimated 
62% of training costs are wage costs of apprentices and only about 23% of training costs are 
associated with the wage costs of the instructors (Schönfeld, Jansen, Wenzelmann, & Pfeifer, 
2016), suggesting that opportunity cost reduction plays only a secondary role. To the extent that 
a recession is expected to be of short duration, however, firms may still hire new apprentices in 
2020 if they expect that they will need to fill skilled-worker positions in by 2023. Of course, 
even though our focus is on the demand side, with the firm’s decision to provide 
apprenticeships, it should not be left unmentioned that there is a supply side to this problem as 
well. Here, too, several effects are conceivable, as unemployment increases the supply of 
applicants for skilled positions or, on the other hand, interest in apprenticeship positions may 
decrease, as school graduates opt for further schooling instead of attempting to enter the VET 
labor market in times of high unemployment (Weßling, Hartung, & Hillmert, 2015). 
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Based on these theoretical foundations, empirical studies mostly describe a positive (pro-
cyclical) effect of business cycle developments on the number of apprenticeship contracts 
offered. This effect, however, is estimated to be small to moderate in size. Brunello (2009) 
provides a useful overview of empirical research. Among others, pro-cyclical behavior of 
apprenticeship markets has been shown for Norway (Askilden & Nilsen, 2005), Denmark 
(Westergaard-Nielsen & Rasmussen, 1999), or the United Kingdom (Merrilees, 1983), 
predominantly using income, investment, order backlog, or unemployment statistics as 
independent variables. More recently, the Swiss cantonal context has attracted significant 
attention of researchers, again suggesting a pro-cyclical effect of economic developments on 
apprenticeships (Schweri & Müller, 2008). The relationship is estimated to be small and largely 
overshadowed by more important demographic drivers (i.e. number of school graduates; 
Mühlemann et al., 2009). Lüthi and Wolter (2020a) provide the most recent contribution that 
analyzes Swiss data. While they conclude pro-cyclical effects as well, their evaluation provides 
a more nuanced picture. Emphasizing the importance of longer-term expectations, they argue 
that unemployment changes largely only lead to postponing of training activities, while GDP 
changes have a more sustained, moderate effect. Compared to Germany, however, the Swiss 
labor market may put greater emphasis on productivity-related training motivations 
(Mühlemann et al., 2010), leaving us with some question marks regarding the transferability of 
these findings to our empirical context. 
When looking specifically at the German labor market, research has yet to produce conclusive 
interpretations of empirical data. In what is probably the study covering the longest time period 
to date, Baldi, Brüggemann-Borck, and Schlaak (2014) investigate business cycle related 
drivers of apprenticeship contracts offered in Germany between 1999 and 2012. Their analysis 
shows that the effects of income growth and unemployment rates are small to none during what 
they refer to as “normal times” (p. 11). They do suggest, however, that this picture is a clearer 
one during more pronounced downturns, such as the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. 
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Similar results are reported by Bellmann et al. (2014), who also investigate the impact of the 
2008/2009 downturn on German apprenticeship numbers. Their findings indicate that while 
training activities declined during the crisis years, they did so irrespective of whether the firm 
was directly affected by the recession, driven more by the general macroeconomic outlook. 
They also argue that apprenticeships seem to be more robust to business cycle influences, based, 
however, on a short-term difference-in-differences estimation. Both contributions suggest that 
effects depend markedly on expectations about the general severity and duration of the 
economic downturn. Dietrich and Gerner (2007) offer the most directly applicable precedent to 
our study. In contrast to the previously mentioned publications, they do not look at actual 
economic developments, as measured by (lagged) income growth or unemployment rates, but 
instead look at the relationship between short-term business expectations and training 
provision. They show a pro-cyclical effect on the amount of training provided by firms, arguing 
mainly based on corresponding changes in assumptions about future transaction and 
opportunity cost. 
We build on these prior contributions and offer the first long-term empirical analysis of business 
cycle effects on the German apprenticeship market that includes both the period of the Great 
Recession and initial data on economic expectations in the anticipated downturn caused by the 
Covid-19 pandemic. Lüthi and Wolter (2020b) have put forward a first projection of likely, 
decisively negative impacts of current economic developments on the Swiss apprenticeship 
market. They argue that especially bankruptcies may push the decrease of offered training 
positions beyond what we have observed during past downturns. Maier (2020) develops a first 
scenario analysis for the German context, highlighting in particular the unevenness of the (again 
pro-cyclical) effect of ongoing developments. We offer an initial view of what can be expected 
for the German VET labor market based on current business cycle expectations. 
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4. Data and variable construction 
In this section we provide information and descriptive statistics for our main variables of 
interest: demand and supply for apprentices and the resulting number of new annual 
apprenticeship contracts in Germany, unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful applicants in the 
apprenticeship market, as well as two measures of company business cycle expectations. We 
further include descriptive statistics on the number of school leavers. 
ifo Business Climate Index (BCI) and ifo Employment Barometer (EB) 
Our main explanatory variable captures the expectation of firms about the business cycle at a 
particular point in time, as surveyed on a monthly basis by the ifo Institute. Figure 1 shows the 
development of our two indicators of interest, the Business Climate Index (BCI) and the 
Employment Barometer (EB) from January 2005 onwards. The BCI indicates companies’ 
assessment of the current business climate and their expectations for the next six months. It is 
one of Germany’s most relevant indicators about business cycle developments and a valid 
predictor of future GDP. The EB measures firms’ employment plans for the following three 
months and may therefore also be a good predictor of firm decisions to hire apprentices. 
Both indices reflect a significant drop during 2008 (the start of the financial crisis) and 
illustrates the subsequent recovery.5 In recent years, business cycle expectations continued to 
increase until August 2018, when both the BCI and the EB reached their peaks. They then 
decreased steadily but continuously, until the start of the coronavirus outbreak and the 
associated lockdown in Germany in March 2020. The BCI (EB) subsequently dropped to 74.3 
(86.3) points in April 2020, their lowest value since January 2005. In May 2020, the indices 
                                                 
5 However, the firms’ employment plans, as measured in the EB, tend to be less volatile compared to the 
assessment of the business climate, which can be explained by frictions in the German labor market 
(employment protection legislation) as well as the possibility for firms to apply for short-time work 
compensation that typically prevent firms from immediate layoffs during an economic crisis. 
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recovered slightly to 79.5 (88.6) points. Thus, the current average BCI (EB) stands at 76.9 
(87.3) for the second quarter, 21.7 (13.3) points lower than the second quarter in 2019.  
As we only observe the yearly number of apprenticeship contracts, the indices need to be 
redefined on an annual basis as well. Table 2 illustrates the average annual change in BCI and 
EB, when considering the average of the first quarter ( 𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄1), the second quarter (𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2), or 
the first six months (𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄1+𝑄2) of a particular year. As shown below, annual differences appear 
qualitatively rather similar. Our empirical estimates do not depend strongly on the exact 
definition of the relevant observation period to compute Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (and Δ𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ ).6  
Figure 1: ifo Business Climate Index and ifo Employment Barometer (January 2005 to May 2020) 
 
Source: ifo Business Climate Index (ifo Geschäftsklimaindex), normalized to the average of the year 2015, 
https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-business-climate-index), and ifo Employment Barometer (ifo 
Beschäftigungsbarometer), normalized to the average of the year 2015, https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-
employment-barometer; see Sauer and Wohlrabe (2020) for detailed methodologies. 
 
                                                 
6 For reasons of brevity, we refrain from always reporting all of our results of both BCI and EB, but we include a 
model that uses the EB as an independent variable in our main regression tables in section 6 (Table 2, Table 4, 
and Table 5). As it turns out, our results are very similar and robust irrespective of which of the two indicators 
we use in our regression models. 
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Table 1: Yearly changes in the ifo Business Climate Index (BCI) and the ifo Employment Barometer 
(EB; 2005-2020) 
Year 𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄1 𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2 𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄1+𝑄2 Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄1 Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2 Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄1+𝑄2 𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2 Δ𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2 
2005 91.3 89.5 90.4 n/a n/a n/a 92.0 n/a 
2006 97.4 98.6 98.0 6.1 9.1 7.6 98.2 6.2 
2007 100.5 100.7 100.6 3.1 2.1 2.6 100.0 1.8 
2008 97.8 96.4 97.1 -2.7 -4.3 -3.5 98.6 -1.4 
2009 80.8 82.4 81.6 -17.0 -14.0 -15.5 88.7 -9.9 
2010 90.9 95.5 93.2 10.1 13.0 11.6 96.7 8.1 
2011 101.9 102.1 102.0 11.0 6.7 8.8 102.3 5.6 
2012 98.8 98.4 98.6 -3.1 -3.8 -3.4 99.8 -2.5 
2013 97.2 96.4 96.8 -1.7 -2.0 -1.8 97.8 -1.9 
2014 101.1 100.6 100.8 3.9 4.2 4.0 99.7 1.9 
2015 98.8 100.1 99.5 -2.3 -0.4 -1.4 100.0 0.2 
2016 99.1 99.9 99.5 0.3 -0.3 0.0 100.1 0.1 
2017 101.4 103.0 102.2 2.3 3.1 2.7 102.8 2.7 
2018 104.2 102.7 103.5 2.9 -0.3 1.3 104.0 1.2 
2019 99.4 98.6 99.0 -4.9 -4.0 -4.4 100.6 -3.4 
2020 92.6 74.3 88.0 -6.8 -21.7* -12.68* 87.3 -13.3* 
Source: ifo Business Climate Index (ifo Geschäftsklimaindex, https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-business-climate-
index) and ifo Employment Barometer (ifo Beschäftigungsbarometer, https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-
employment-barometer). *Q2 only includes April and May in 2020. 
 
 
Demand and supply of apprentices 
A firm’s demand for apprentices is defined as the sum of the number of apprenticeship contracts 
and unfilled vacancies that firms post in a given year.7 Figure 2 shows that the demand for 
apprentices correlates strongly with the business climate in the period between 2007 and 2019.8 
In particular, the decrease in the demand for apprentices as a result of the financial crisis in 
                                                 
7 Note that unfilled vacancies only include registered vacancies with the Federal Employment Agency, and not 
the entire population of unfilled vacancies in Germany. Although no statistics exists that include the population 
of all statistics in Germany, registered vacancies with the Federal Employment Agency likely correlate strongly 
with the total number of vacancies in Germany over time.    
8 The state-level data is published by the Federal Employment Agency and refers to the 30th of September of 
each year. Note that contrary to this, all data at the occupation-level (Table 5, Table A1-A2, Tables A4-A6) refer 
to the 31st of December of each year and, thus, also cover all contracts that were signed or terminated between 
the 30th of September and the end of the respective year. 
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2009 and 2010 is clearly visible, as well as the subsequent increase during the economic 
recovery. 
The supply of apprentices is defined as the number of individuals that apply for an 
apprenticeship position in a particular year.9 Figure 3 shows that the supply correlates strongly 
with the number of school leavers. However, other factors such as the regional share of high 
school graduates and individual preferences may also play an important role. 
 
Figure 2: Demand for apprentices, ifo Business Climate Index (BCI), and ifo Employment Barometer 
(EB; 2007-2019) 
 
Source: ifo Business Climate Index (ifo Geschäftsklimaindex, https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-business-climate-
index), and ifo Employment Barometer (ifo Beschäftigungsbarometer, https://www.ifo.de/en/survey/ifo-
employment-barometer); Federal Employment Agency (statistics on the apprenticeship market). 
 
                                                 
9 Note that the supply is defined as the sum of the number of apprenticeship contracts and the number of 
unsuccessful applicants who are registered with the Federal Employment Agency, and not the entire population 
of unsuccessful applicants in Germany.  
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Figure 3: Supply of apprentices and number of school leavers (2007-2019)  
 
Source: Federal Employment Agency (statistics on the apprenticeship market). Federal Statistical Office (school 
leavers from general schools, excluding vocational schools) 
 
New apprenticeship contracts 
In Germany, some firms already sign apprenticeship contracts early in the year, while others 
only find a suitable apprentice shortly before the start of training in August or September10. 
Since many of the temporal aspects of the recruiting process are unclear or vary between firms 
and industries, it is not possible to precisely model in what month a firm’s business expectations 
are most relevant when it comes to hiring apprentices. Furthermore, as we have described 
above, a firm can terminate apprenticeship contracts rather easily during the first one to four 
months of training and prior to the commencement of training. For that reason, we also estimate 
a regression to test whether changes in the Business Climate Index are associated with 
subsequent changes in the number of prematurely terminated apprenticeship contracts, 
however, without significant results (cf. Table A3).  
                                                 
10 The exact start of an apprenticeship program varies by state. By May 2020, a total of 465,700 apprenticeship 
positions were advertised by training firms (-9.1% compared to 2019) and 204,000 individuals had successfully 
signed an apprenticeship contract ((-14.6% compared to 2019, cf. Federal Employment Agency, 2020b). 
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Figure 4 shows the development of the annual number of firm-sponsored apprenticeship 
contracts since 2007 and includes all apprenticeship contracts as of 31 December 2018. Thus, 
any contract that was terminated after or even before the start of training would not be included 
in our data. The data further do not include publicly financed apprenticeship positions for 
people with disabilities, because their provision and governing regulations follow different 
principles compared to “regular” apprenticeship positions. Figure 4 illustrates that the number 
of firm-based apprenticeship contracts in Germany decreased from over 600,000 in 2007 to 
about 500,000 in 2016 and that this development correlates strongly with the annual number of 
school leavers. Moreover, we can observe an unusually strong decline in the number of 
apprenticeship contracts following the financial crisis from 2008 to 2009, when apprenticeships 
fell by 7.7% year over year. While demographic change (fewer school leavers) likely accounts 
for part of the decrease in the number of apprenticeship contracts throughout the observed 
period, the magnitude of the decline during the crisis years 2008 and 2009 suggests that 
economic conditions likely play a role as well. However, based on descriptive statistics, we 
cannot clearly distinguish the influence of demographic changes, business cycle fluctuations, 
other structural developments at the industry-level, or regional differences (such as the well-
known matching problems that routinely leads to unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful 
applicants) by only looking at aggregate numbers for Germany.  
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Figure 4: Number of firm-sponsored apprenticeship contracts and school leavers (2007-2018) 
 
 
Sources: Vocational Training Statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments; Federal 
Statistical Office (school leavers from general schools, excluding vocational schools) 
 
For our empirical analysis we use the register of all apprenticeship contracts per year, starting 
in 2007. The contract information is collected by the regional chambers of commerce and then 
processed to the Federal Statistical Office. The final dataset is provided by the Federal Institute 
for Vocational Education and Training (BIBB)11. Reporting is mandatory for the regional 
chambers of industry and commerce, so that the register represents a full sample of all 
apprenticeships in Germany. Data include characteristics of the apprentice (contract holder) as 
well as regional and occupation-specific details. With this information, we construct a panel 
dataset that includes the number of new contracts in a given occupation, the state (Bundesland), 
and the contract year. A total of 321 occupations are recorded in the dual training system for all 
16 federal states over a period of 12 years (from 2007 until 2018)12. The average number of 
                                                 
11 For more details on the data contents see Destatis (2012). For a discussion of the research potential of this data 
see Rohrbach-Schmidt and Uhly (2016). 
12 Microdata for 2019 were not yet available at the time of publication.  
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apprenticeships per occupation by state is reported in the appendix (Tables A1 and A2). We 
also match the number of school leavers at the state-year level, in order to control for regional 
demographic change in our empirical analysis. 
 
Figure 5: Number of apprenticeships by prior educational attainment (2007-2018) 
 
 Source: Vocational Training Statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments 
 
 
A further notable characteristic of the German apprenticeship market is the difference in the 
development of apprenticeship contracts by applicants’ prior educational attainment, as 
presented in Figure 5. A clear negative trend can be observed in the number of apprenticeship 
contracts for lower-school graduates (LS, Hauptschule) and graduates with a mid-level school 
qualification (MS, Realschule). Conversely, the number of apprenticeship contracts with 
individuals who have a high school degree (HS, Abitur), which also allows them to study at a 
German university, increased continuously from 2009 to 2018. With this in mind, we carry out 
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our analysis at the state-level and further account for the occupational field at the 3-digit level. 
Differentiation at the occupational level is important, because there is substantial heterogeneity 
across apprenticeship occupations with regard to educational requirements, training duration 
and future employment prospects (e.g., expected wage that an apprentice will earn as a skilled 
worker, as well as development opportunities). We further include distinct models, separated 
by educational subset of our sample (cf. Tables A4-A6). 
 
Frictions in the German apprenticeship market: the dynamics of unfilled vacancies and 
unsuccessful applicants  
So far, the descriptions provided are still missing one important dynamic: matching. The 
number of observed apprenticeship contracts in a particular year does not simply depend on 
aggregate demand and supply. Instead, it is crucial that the type of demand matches the type of 
supply in a given geographical or occupational area of the labor market. Resulting frictions, 
expressed in the number of unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful applicants, are important pieces 
of information that should be taken into account in the context of business cycle fluctuations. 
Figure 6 highlights that in the year following the financial crisis, both the number of unfilled 
apprenticeship vacancies as well as the number of unsuccessful applicants for apprenticeship 
positions were rather low, at less than 20,000 (unfilled vacancies) and 15,000 (unsuccessful 
applicants) respectively. In light of the economic recovery that started in 2010 and reached its 
peak in 2011, the number of unfilled vacancies began to increase, while the number of 
unsuccessful applicants initially dropped. As the economy remained strong through 2018, the 
number of unfilled vacancies increased substantially and came close to reaching 58,000 in 2018. 
At the same time, however, the number of unsuccessful applicants started to increase, despite 
the overall number of school leavers in Germany declining – an indication for an increased 
matching problem in the German apprenticeship market.  
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Figure 6: Number of unfilled vacancies, unsuccessful applicants, ifo Business Climate Index (BCI), 
and ifo Employment Barometer (EB; 2007-2019) 
 
Source: Apprenticeship market statistics 2007-2019, Federal Employment Agency (2020b), ifo Business Climate 
Index and ifo Employment Barometer. 
 
A more detailed analysis at the state-level reveals that the dynamics differ quite strongly across 
states. States in the South and East of Germany did not experience an increase in the share of 
unsuccessful applicants, while North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, as well 
as Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein experienced increased matching problems, as both the 
share of unfilled vacancies and the share of unsuccessful applicants increased from 2010-2018 
(Figures A1-A4). Moreover, the level of unsuccessful applicants is lowest in the South of 
Germany (Baden-Wurttemberg and Bavaria)13.  
                                                 
13 Within states, there are also some differences in the development of unfilled vacancies that depend on 
occupational fields (crafts sector vs. industry and trade), as indicated in Figures A5-A8.  
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In addition to the described issues, there may also be many young applicants that fall outside 
of the definition of “unsuccessful”, as they were able to secure an alternative to an 
apprenticeship contract (e.g., a preparation year in order to close any skill gaps or other school-
based alternatives). In 2019, on top of roughly 25,000 unsuccessful applicants, another 20,000 
individuals were still actively searching for an apprenticeship position despite having found an 
alternative to an apprenticeship (Federal Employment Agency, 2020b). 
 
 
5. Identification strategy 
We follow Mühlemann et al. (2009), who estimate changes in the number of annual 
apprenticeships at the state-level. However, in our data, we are able to observe the number of 
apprenticeship positions not only for a particular state, but we also observe the occupational 
field within each state at the 5-digit level. Thus, our main dependent variable of interest is the 
logarithm of new apprenticeships in occupation 𝑜, state 𝑠 and year 𝑡: 
𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝜐𝑜𝑠  +  𝐱𝑠𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡  
where 𝜐𝑠𝑜 accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the state- and occupation-level, and 𝐱 
includes our main variable of interest (𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑄2), as well as the logarithm of graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡 from 
general schools in state 𝑠 in period 𝑡. The error term is represented by 𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡.  
We estimate first-differences regression models to account for unobserved factors at the state- 
and occupation-level. The differences in new annual (log) apprenticeship contracts are given 
by: 
𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 = (𝐱𝑠𝑡 − 𝐱𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1)
′
𝛽 + (𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡−1) 
To obtain consistent estimates, it is required that 𝐸[(𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡−1)|(𝐱𝑠𝑡 − 𝐱𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1)] = 0. This 
assumption is weaker compared to the strong exogeneity condition that is required to estimate 
an alternative fixed effects model, where 𝐸[𝜀𝑜𝑠𝑡|𝐱𝑠1, … , 𝐱𝑠𝑇] = 0. We estimate first-differences 
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using OLS and report heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors. We also 
include interaction terms of linear trends for 3-digit occupations and for East Germany, in order 
to account for occupation-specific trends and the stronger decrease in the number of 
apprenticeships in recent years in East German states (Tables A1 and A2). 
Moreover, using the same framework, we estimate the demand for apprentices and the 
determinants of unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful applicants for the period 2007 to 2019, 
using state-level data from the Federal Employment Agency (2020b). In particular, we estimate 
first differences in the log demand for apprentices that is given by 
𝑑𝑠𝑡 − 𝑑𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 = (𝐱𝑠𝑡 − 𝐱𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1)
′
𝛽 + (𝜀𝑠𝑡 − 𝜀𝑠𝑡−1), 
where 𝑣𝑠𝑡 denotes the log demand for apprentices in state s at time t. Similarly, we estimate 
additional models using the log number of unfilled vacancies (𝑣𝑠𝑡) and unsuccessful applicants 
(𝑢𝑠𝑡) as dependent variables. 
 
6. Results 
The following section reports the results of our first-differences regressions. Our main interest 
is to quantify the association between BCI or EB and the number of new apprenticeship 
contracts, conditional on controlling for the number of school graduates. Therefore, our key 
independent variables are Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑄2𝑡−1 and Δ𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡,𝑄2𝑡−1, which capture annual changes 
between second quarter average values of BCI and EB. We estimate the effect of these 
explanatory observations in subsequent models on log annual changes in the demand for 
apprentices, the number of unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful applicants, as well as in the 
number of apprenticeship contracts.  
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Demand for apprentices and business cycle expectations 
We first regress state-level demand for apprentices on BCI/EB and find, as expected, a positive 
and statistically significant association. According to Model 3, a 1-point increase in the BCI in 
period t (period t-1) is associated with a 0.37% (0.29%) increase in the demand for apprentices. 
To illustrate the economic significance, consider the demand for apprentices in 2009 compared 
to 2008: the BCI dropped by 14 points from 2008 to 2009, and by 4.4 points from 2007 to 2008.  
 
Table 2: First-differences regression, demand for of apprentices (state-level, 2007-2019) 
 
Log demand for apprentices ∆𝑑𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.00318*** 0.00322*** 0.00371***  
  (0.000389) (0.000418) (0.000455)  
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2  
 
 0.00295***  
   (0.000633)  
∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1    0.00588*** 
     (0.000712) 
∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2 
 
   0.00393*** 
     (0.000901) 
∆ log number of school graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 
  
  0.135*** 0.111** 0.115** 
 
(0.0422) (0.0381) (0.0382) 
∆ log number of school graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2  
 
 
 
0.0963** 0.0949** 
(0.0388) (0.0385) 
Constant 0.00176 0.00440 0.00475 0.00293 
  (0.00464) (0.00386) (0.00373) (0.00382) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 
R-Squared 0.136 0.193 0.332 0.342 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10%-level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments; ifo Business Climate Index and ifo Employment 
Barometer. 
 
Thus, according to our model, changes in the BCI from 2007 to 2009 were associated with a  
∂d
∂BIC
= (−14) ∗ 0.00371 +  (−4.3) ∗ 0.00295 =  −0.065 (or − 6.5%) decrease in the 
demand for apprentices. Taking into account the most recent changes in BCI between 2019 and 
2020, our model predicts that firm demand for apprentices will decrease by 
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∂d
∂BIC
= (−21.7) ∗ 0.00371 +  (−4) ∗ 0.00295 = −.0923, or −9.23%.14 Using the 
coefficients based on the ifo Employment Barometer, we find almost identical results, as 
 
∂d
∂EB
= (−13.3) ∗ 0.00588 +  (−3.4) ∗ 0.00393 = −.0916, or −9.16%. 
 
Unfilled vacancies, unsuccessful applicants, and business cycle expectations 
In competitive markets, we expect that we do not observe unfilled vacancies or unsuccessful 
applicants, as prices (which is mainly the apprentice wage in the context of apprenticeship 
training) would adjust and the market would eventually reach a new equilibrium after an 
unexpected macroeconomic shock (such as the financial crisis, or the current coronavirus 
pandemic). However, as already illustrated in Figure 6, there are considerable frictions in the 
German apprenticeship market that led to 53,000 unfilled vacancies in 2019 as well as almost 
25,000 unsuccessful applicants.  
Regressing unfilled vacancies on BCI at the state-level, we find a strong and positive effect. A 
1-point increase in the BCI was associated with a 1.02% increase in unfilled vacancies. 
Moreover, when accounting for lagged effects, we find that a 1-point increase in the BCI in two 
consecutive years was associated with a 2.18% increase in unfilled vacancies (Models 1-3, 
Table 3). Conversely, we find no statistically significant association with changes in the BCI 
and changes in the number of unsuccessful applicants (Models 4-6, Table 3).15 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Our prediction is very close to currently observed changes in the demand for apprentices compared to the 
previous year, which decreased by 9.1% (apprenticeship market statistics May 2020; Federal Employment 
Agency, 2020b). 
15 We also ran the same regressions using EB rather than BCI as independent variables. The results are very 
similar and not included for reasons of brevity. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Table 3: First-differences regression, unfilled vacancies and unsuccessful applicants (state-level, 2007-
2019) 
 
Dependent variable: Log unfilled vacancies ∆𝑣𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Log unsuccessful applicants ∆𝑢𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.00876** 0.00868** 0.0102*** -0.00217 -0.00193 -0.00206 
  (0.00302) (0.00308) (0.00308) (0.00562) (0.00559) (0.00587) 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2  
 
 0.0116***  
 
 0.000764 
   (0.00338)  (0.00452) 
∆ log number of school 
graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1  -0.247 -0.338  0.699** 0.695* 
   (0.277) (0.248)  (0.304) (0.344) 
∆ log number of school 
graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2  
 
 
 
-0.170   -0.362 
 (0.168)   (0.367) 
Constant 0.0888*** 0.0840*** 0.0755*** -0.0274** -0.0137 -0.0206 
  (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0114) (0.0119) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 192 192 
R-Squared 
0.034 0.040 0.099 0.001 0.029 0.037 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index and ifo Employment 
Barometer. 
 
 
Apprenticeship contracts and business cycle expectations 
Based on the previous results, we find that changes in BCI or EB are positively associated with 
firm demand for apprentices but are not associated with an increase in unsuccessful applicants 
for apprenticeship positions. We now turn to first estimating the association between BCI/EB 
and the number of apprenticeship contracts at the state-level, and subsequently at the 
occupation-state-level in order to account for occupation-specific heterogeneity and 
developments.16 
The results in Table 4 show the positive association between BCI/EB and the number of signed 
state-level apprenticeship contracts, although the coefficients for ∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 and ∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 are 
somewhat lower than our estimates for labor demand (Table 2), and substantially lower 
                                                 
16 Data at the occupation-level within states are only available until the end of 2018.  
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compared to the regressions of unfilled vacancies (Table 3). Thus, our results suggest that 
business climate changes were not fully absorbed in the German apprenticeship market, instead 
resulting in an increasing number of unfilled vacancies in recent years (when ∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 > 0). 
Our observation, that the number of unsuccessful applicants did not decrease substantially in 
recent years, can be explained i) by matching problems and ii) by the fact that many individuals, 
who are originally interested in apprenticeship training, do not end up being counted as 
unsuccessful applicants. Instead, labor market or schooling alternatives to apprenticeship 
training fill the void created by unsuccessful applications.17  
 
Table 4: First-differences regression, new annual apprenticeship contracts (state-level, 2007-2019) 
Dep.variable: log apprenticeship contracts 
∆𝑎𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.00281*** 0.00285*** 0.00327***  
  (0.000405) (0.000451) (0.000490)  
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2 
 
 
 
0.00243*** 
 
    (0.000701)  
∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1    0.00507*** 
     (0.000760) 
∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2    0.00332*** 
    (0.00100) 
∆ log number of school graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1  0.139*** 0.119** 0.122** 
   (0.0466) (0.0411) (0.0415) 
∆ log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2 
 
 
 
 
0.106** 0.104** 
   (0.0390) (0.0387) 
Constant -0.00308 -0.000355 0.000408 -0.00119 
  (0.00508) (0.00415) (0.00391) (0.00402) 
Observations 192 192 192 192 
R-squared 0.095 0.149 0.248 0.253 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index and ifo Employment 
Barometer. 
However, the number of observations at the state-level is relatively small and we are not able 
to account for occupation-specific heterogeneity by using only aggregate statistics. For that 
                                                 
17 We also ran similar regressions of the number of unsuccessful applicants that had already found an alternative 
(as published by the Federal Employment Agency) on the BCI for the period of 2007-2019, but found no 
evidence for a statistically significant association. 
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reason, we make use of more fine-grained data at the occupation-state-level (vocational training 
statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments). Regression results are 
presented in Table 5. 
In order to estimate the effect of the financial crisis, which started to affect BCI and EB in the 
fall of 2008, we estimate Δ𝑎𝑜𝑠2009,2008 = 𝛽1 ∗ Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑄2𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ∗ Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑄2𝑡−1, which is 
the change in the number of apprenticeship contracts due to changes in the BCI in the particular 
period (applied correspondingly for EB). According to our analysis (Model 5, Table 5), the drop 
in the Business Climate Index from 2008 to 2009 (which was -14 index points, cf. Table 1) was 
therefore associated with a 0.00279 ∗ (−14.0) = −3.9% decrease in the number of 
apprenticeship positions. However, as the index already dropped from the second quarter in 
2007 to the second quarter 2008 by 4.3 index points, this caused an additional decrease in 
apprenticeship contracts of 0.00187 ∗ (−4.3) = −0.8%. In sum, changes in the BCI between 
2007 and 2009 are therefore associated with a 4.7% decrease in the number of apprenticeship 
contracts (ceteris paribus). Our estimation using EB as the key indicator for expected business 
cycle changes yielded larger coefficients, but as the Employment Barometer seems somewhat 
less sensitive to economic developments (leading to a smaller decline, relative to the BCI), total 
results are very similar (4.9% decrease)18. As the overall decrease in the number of new 
apprenticeships from 2008 to 2009 was 7.7% (cf. BIBB, 2019), changes in the BCI can explain 
61% of that decrease in the number of apprenticeship contracts. Clearly, demographic change 
was a second relevant influencing factor that can, in part, explain the decrease in 
apprenticeships in Germany since 2008.  
 
 
 
                                                 
18 Changes in the Employment Barometer (EB) amount to (-1.4) from 2007 to 2008, and (-9.9) from 2008 to 2009 
(Table 1). Thus, based on the coefficients in Model 6 (Table 5), changes in the EB suggest a 4.86% decrease in 
the number of apprenticeship contracts from 2008 to 2009. 
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Table 5: First-differences regression (occupation-state-level, 2007-2018) 
Dependent variable: log 
number of apprenticeship 
contracts ∆𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.00211*** 0.00215*** 0.00284*** 0.00280*** 0.00279***  
  (0.000429) (0.000457) (0.000457) (0.000459) (0.000459)  
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2   0.00201*** 0.00186*** 0.00187***  
    (0.000385) (0.000388) (0.000388)  
∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1      0.00457*** 
      (0.000650) 
∆𝐸𝐵̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2      0.00245*** 
      (0.000576) 
∆ log number of school 
graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1  0.215*** 0.211*** 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.194*** 
   (0.0230) (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0251) (0.0251) 
∆ log number of school 
graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2   0.0908*** 0.0742*** 0.0528*** 0.0568*** 
   (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0250) (0.0250) 
Trend*East Germany 
    
-0.00233*** -0.00273*** 
     (0.000411) (0.000272) 
Occupation-level trends No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0250*** -0.0208*** -0.0244*** -0.118*** -0.114** -0.114** 
  (0.00145) (0.00147) (0.00159) (0.0450) (0.0450) (0.0477) 
Observations 38880 38880 34160 34160 34160 34160 
R-squared 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.028 0.028 0.029 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index (BCI), ifo Employment 
Barometer (EB) 
 
Our analysis further shows that apprentices with a high school degree (and, to a lesser extent, 
individuals with a lower-level school degree, i.e., Hauptschule) are more strongly affected by 
changes in the business cycle (cf. Tables A4-A6; offering additional evidence for suggestions 
by Maier, 2020). By contrast, apprenticeship contracts with individuals that have obtained mid-
level school degrees (Realschule) seem to remain largely unaffected by changes in the business 
climate from 2007-2018. We propose that this is primarily driven by principal differences in 
the availability of labor market or schooling alternatives (to apprenticeships) that are open to 
the respective educational segment. As prospects for available apprenticeship positions worsen 
in an economic downturn, high school graduates may increasingly opt for alternative career 
paths, such as university programs. By contrast, low-level school graduates are expected not to 
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evade negative effects of crises, but instead to suffer from them directly. Two primary 
mechanisms are conceivable. Firstly, as competition for available apprenticeships tightens, 
other applicants with higher-level schooling degrees may increasingly fill positions with usually 
less demanding schooling requirements. Secondly, firms that, during “normal” times, represent 
the primary employers for applicants with low-level schooling qualifications may be exposed 
to higher amounts of economic risks and financial strain during times of crisis, causing them to 
reduce their apprenticeship offering disproportionately, or drop out of the market altogether. 
Mid-level school graduates, on the other hand, seem to be able to potentially benefit from these 
movements in the other two educational segments, leaving them less exposed to business cycle 
developments. 
 
What is the predicted effect of Covid-19 on the German apprenticeship market? 
Figure 7 plots the predicted change in the log number of apprenticeship contracts due to changes 
in the BCI from 2007 to 2018 and adds out-of-sample predictions for the years 2019 and 202019.  
The average level of the second quarter BCI in 2019 was 98.6, while the index fell to 74.3 in 
April, and then slightly increased to 79.5 in May 2020. Therefore, to the extent that we can 
extrapolate our findings from the 2007-2018 period (i.e., our estimates for coefficients 
of ∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 and ∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2 in Table 5, Model 5), we would expect a decline in the number 
of apprenticeship contracts in 2020 of Δ𝑎𝑜𝑠2020,2019 = 𝛽 ∗ Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2 2020,𝑄2 2019 + 𝛽 ∗
Δ𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2 2019,𝑄2 2018 =  0.00279 ∗ (−21.7) + 0.00187 ∗ (−4) ≅ −0.068, (CI: +/- 0.0173).
20 
This corresponds, on average, to approximately 34,700 (95% CI: +/- 8,800) fewer vocational 
                                                 
19 The state- and occupation-level number of apprenticeship contracts are not yet available for 2019, even though 
an estimate of the total number of apprenticeship positions in 2019 (510,710 firm-sponsored apprenticeships) has 
already been published (Berufsbildungsbericht 2019; BIBB, 2019). 
20 The corresponding estimate based on the coefficients of the ifo Employment Barometer (EB) in Model 6 
(Table 5) is almost identical, as (−3.4) ∗ 0.00245 + (−13.3) ∗ 0.00457 = −0.069. 
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training positions compared to 2019, largely due to the recent Covid-19-induced change in 
expectations about the business climate21. 
 
Figure 7: Marginal effects of the BCI (ceteris paribus) on the number of new apprenticeships (2007-
2018) and predicted effects for the years 2019 and 2020 
 
Notes: Blue line indicates to what extent changes in the ifo BCI (average value of the second quarter of each year) 
affect the annual number of new apprenticeship contracts signed by the end of the same year. Out-of-sample 
forecasts for the years 2019 and 2020 that include current ifo BCI data for January 2019 – May 2020. Data sources: 
Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate 
Index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 A further effect of changes in business cycle expectations could be an increase in the premature termination 
rate of apprenticeship contracts. Our state-level estimates in Table A3, however, show no evidence that changes 
in the BCI had a statistically significant association with changes in the rate of premature apprenticeship contract 
terminations in the years 2007-2018. 
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7. Conclusions  
Empirical evidence for Germany shows that the apprenticeship market is susceptible to business 
cycle fluctuations. Thus, the large and unexpected economic shock associated with the Covid-
19 pandemic and the lockdown measures that came in its wake are likely to affect the German 
apprenticeship market in 2020. Based on our analysis of the association between two indicators 
of business cycle expectations (the ifo Business Climate Index and the ifo Employment 
Barometer) and subsequent apprenticeship contracts from 2007 to 2018, which also includes 
the financial crisis in 2008/2009, we predict that current company expectations about business 
cycle developments will lead to a reduction in the number of apprenticeship contracts in 
August/September 2020 by 6.8% or 34,700 positions (95% CI: +/- 8,800). Moreover, our results 
suggest that the effect of the crisis will be more pronounced for the demand for apprentices 
(i.e., the sum of apprenticeship contracts and unfilled vacancies), where our regression model 
predicts a 9.1% decrease based on German firms’ current business cycle expectations (as 
measured through the BCI). This is driven by frictions in the apprenticeship market. In 2019, 
the total demand for apprentices exceeded the total supply and resulted in 53,000 unfilled 
vacancies. Therefore, the effect of Covid-19 on the number of apprenticeship contracts will 
likely be less severe than if we had had a situation of excess supply prior to the start of the 
current crisis, as was the case in 2008 (before the start of the financial crisis). In a number of 
occupations and regions in 2020, many firms would simply not have been able to successfully 
fill their vacancies in the absence of the coronavirus crisis, in part because demographic changes 
continue to put downward pressure on the number of school leavers. Furthermore, we did not 
find any statistically significant association between changes in the BCI/EB and changes in the 
number of unsuccessful applicants in the period between 2007 and 2019. Thus, there is some 
hope that the number of unsuccessful applicants in the apprenticeship market will not increase 
as drastically in occupations where demand exceeded supply in 2019. Nonetheless, there will 
likely be a strong increase in the number of individuals that have to accept alternative 
 31 
educational arrangements, such as preparatory courses to increase the chances to secure an 
apprenticeship position in 2021 (and thus compete for apprenticeship positions with next year’s 
school leavers). Our analysis shows that this will apply especially to school graduates with 
lower school attainment (Hauptschule), because those with a high-school degree (Abitur) will 
have other options available to them, for example, to pursue a tertiary degree. 
A cautionary note appears appropriate for all our forward-looking results. While our 
econometric model offers predictions based on historic market information, it cannot provide 
definitive answers for how the crisis and associated consequences for apprenticeships will 
unfold. We do, however, provide initial means to estimate and thus prepare for the likely impact 
of Covid-19 on the German apprenticeship market. Furthermore, the benefit of our approach is 
that the analysis can easily be updated once more data become available. Our predictions remain 
a “best guess” estimate, based on the information available at the time.  
Finally, the current pandemic and the resulting economic downturn coincide with significant 
regulatory changes that have introduced a minimum wage for German apprentices at the 
beginning of 2020. Initial studies on the likely impact of the specific level of the German 
minimum wage for apprentices suggest that it is largely small companies and those in the 
eastern German states that would see rising costs (Wenzelmann & Pfeifer, 2018). These 
influences may be felt in addition to the expected effects we have described and while we do 
not discuss them in greater detail, they should provide ample material for future research efforts. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Number of new apprenticeships by occupation (2007-2012) 
  Number of apprenticeships by occupation 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
State Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Schleswig-Holstein 94 193 92 189 90 181 86 182 87 180 86 178 
Hamburg 68 134 68 135 63 124 67 134 63 131 63 127 
Lower Saxony 226 481 219 476 209 453 215 472 227 499 216 470 
Bremen 32 58 32 58 31 54 32 55 31 56 32 58 
North Rhine-Westphalia 458 1075 436 991 412 957 426 1003 429 1017 420 996 
Hesse 162 383 155 362 147 348 144 344 147 344 148 340 
Rhineland-Palatinate 125 277 117 254 113 249 114 249 111 247 110 239 
Baden-Württemberg 284 641 280 639 269 610 264 606 277 634 265 622 
Bavaria 359 836 356 841 322 760 326 779 332 795 333 774 
Saarland 47 90 45 85 45 85 43 80 44 78 43 80 
Berlin 100 231 89 207 86 194 83 187 79 175 81 178 
Brandenburg 77 166 69 145 60 127 56 117 49 101 46 94 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 76 164 65 132 51 101 47 90 42 78 41 75 
Saxony 115 239 98 207 89 193 79 171 74 158 69 136 
Saxony-Anhalt 81 164 74 148 62 125 57 115 52 106 51 98 
Thuringia 73 142 66 129 56 108 51 100 46 88 46 85 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
 
 
Table A2: Number of new apprenticeships by occupation (2013-2018) 
  Number of apprenticeships by occupation 
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
State Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Schleswig-Holstein 81 170 83 172 82 169 87 174 84 170 84 165 
Hamburg 61 124 61 123 62 126 62 123 61 120 62 120 
Lower Saxony 205 453 211 460 204 445 204 440 211 445 206 439 
Bremen 31 55 31 55 31 55 31 55 31 53 30 54 
North Rhine-Westphalia 415 981 402 948 401 943 400 927 408 933 408 928 
Hesse 140 317 140 312 138 308 135 301 141 303 141 308 
Rhineland-Palatinate 104 225 105 228 103 217 104 218 100 214 102 212 
Baden-Württemberg 259 598 258 592 264 597 262 588 267 591 271 593 
Bavaria 321 755 319 745 321 745 316 735 326 748 331 759 
Saarland 42 74 40 70 41 71 39 69 39 68 37 64 
Berlin 74 161 72 152 71 148 70 146 70 142 72 143 
Brandenburg 44 86 43 83 44 86 43 83 42 84 44 86 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 38 72 39 71 38 71 39 69 39 68 40 71 
Saxony 68 134 69 136 69 134 71 135 75 141 75 143 
Saxony-Anhalt 47 93 48 94 48 92 48 93 45 87 47 90 
Thuringia 44 82 43 80 45 80 44 78 45 81 46 83 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
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Table A3: First-differences regression, prematurely terminated training contracts (state-level) 
Dependent variable (log): ∆𝑡𝑐𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Model 1 Model 2 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 -0.0000517 0.0000429 
  (0.000381) (0.000373) 
∆log number of school graduates 𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1   0.00125 
    (0.0445) 
Constant 0.000373 -0.00333 
  (0.00535) (0.00599) 
Observations 176 174 
R-squared 0.148 0.428 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index. 
 
 
 
Table A4: First-differences regression (occupation-state-level, apprentices with a high school degree) 
Dependent variable (log): ∆𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.00196*** 0.00247*** 0.00273*** 0.00267*** 0.00257** 
  (0.000592) (0.000590) (0.000640) (0.000644) (0.000645) 
∆log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1  0.179*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.160*** 
  
 (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0186) 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2   0.00181*** 0.00165*** 0.00163*** 
    (0.000552) (0.000558) (0.000557) 
∆log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2 
  
0.0634*** 0.0617*** 0.0433*** 
   (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0178) 
Trend*East Germany     -0.0527** 
     (0.00426) 
Occupation-level trends No No No Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0301*** 0.0299*** 0.0287*** -0.0488 -0.0366 
  (0.00197) (0.00195) (0.00215) (0.0343) (0.0391) 
Observations 27367 27367 24669 24669 24669 
R-squared 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.021 0.023 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index. 
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Table A5: First-differences regression (occupation-state-level, apprentices with a mid-level school 
degree) 
Dependent variable (log): ∆𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.000842 0.000830 0.0000311 -0.00000704 0.0000177 
  (0.000526) (0.000526) (0.000565) (0.000568) (0.000569) 
∆log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1   0.0855*** 0.0561** 0.0517** 0.0498** 
  
 
(0.0235) (0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0254) 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2     -0.000123 -0.000285 -0.000281 
      (0.000477) (0.000482) (0.000482) 
∆log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2 
    
0.158*** 0.149*** 0.129** 
     (0.0220) (0.0222) (0.0225) 
Trend*East Germany         -0.0252*** 
         (0.00327) 
Occupation-level trends No No No Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0288*** -0.0271*** -0.0187*** -0.297*** -0.297*** 
  (0.00164) (0.00168) (0.00180) (0.0467) (0.0467) 
Observations 33754 33754 30129 30129 30129 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.015 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index. 
 
 
 
Table A6: First-differences regression (occupation-state-level, apprentices with low-level school 
degree) 
Dependent variable (log): ∆𝑎𝑜𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡,𝑡−1 0.00149** 0.00126** 0.00142** 0.00143** 0.00144** 
  (0.000621) (0.000627) (0.000656) (0.000663) (0.000663) 
∆log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡,𝑡−1   0.109*** 0.0657* 0.0455 0.0406 
  
 
(0.0372) (0.0398) (0.0400) (0.0403) 
∆𝐵𝐶𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑄2𝑡−1,𝑡−2     0.000535 0.000449 0.000447 
      (0.000580) (0.000585) (0.000585) 
∆log number of school graduates 
𝑔𝑠𝑡−1,𝑡−2 
    
0.0342 0.0142 0.0160 
     (0.0383) (0.0386) (0.0386) 
Trend*East Germany         0.0178** 
         (0.00472) 
Occupation-level trends No No No Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0348*** -0.0292*** -0.0297*** 0.554 0.554 
  (0.00196) (0.00264) (0.00315) (0.388) (0.388) 
Observations 26851 26851 24046 24046 24046 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.013 0.014 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ Significant at the 1%-
level; ∗∗ significant at the 5%-level; ∗ significant at the 10% level. Data sources: Vocational training statistics of 
the statistical offices of the federal and state governments, ifo Business Climate Index. 
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Figure A1: Beveridge curves for South German states (2007-2019) 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
 
Figure A2: Beveridge curves for West German states (2007-2019) 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
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Figure A3: Beveridge curves for North-Western German states (2007-2019) 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
 
 
 
Figure A4: Beveridge curves for East German states (2007-2019) 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
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Figure A5: Share of unfilled vacancies in craft (HWK) and industry & trade (IHK) for South German 
states, 2015-2019 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
 
 
Figure A6: Share of unfilled vacancies in craft (HWK) and industry & trade (IHK) for West German 
states, 2015-2019 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
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Figure A7: Share of unfilled vacancies in craft (HWK) and industry & trade (IHK) for North-Western 
German states, 2015-2019 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
 
 
 
Figure A8: Share of unfilled vacancies in craft (HWK) and industry & trade (IHK) for East German 
states, 2015-2019 
 
Data sources: Vocational training statistics of the statistical offices of the federal and state governments. 
